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Appearance and Reality in World Politics: E. H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis 
 
Peter Wilson, LSE 
 
(Accepted for publication November 2009 in Politik: Danish Journal of Political 
Science) 
 
If successful prediction or policy prescription were the hallmarks of analytical 
distinction in the field of International Relations (IR) it is doubtful whether The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis would presently see much light of day.  The chief policy 
recommendation of the book, appeasement, had been abandoned—at least 
with regard to Germany—long before the book went into print in September 
1939. With the onset of war the benefit of the doubt Carr gave to Hitler and 
the harshness of his judgments against President Wilson and a procession of 
Western statesmen soon began to look rash and ill-judged. By the end of the 
war the death knell he sounded for nationalism, national self-determination, 
the small state, free trade and laissez-faire, all of which he felt had been 
rendered obsolescent by the rise of combination, concentration, and large-
scale social and economic planning, was already sounding faint. It would soon 
be all but muffled by a Bretton Woods system characterised by pegged but 
adjustable rates of exchange and a commitment to progressively and 
multilaterally reduce barriers to trade; a Marshall Plan predicated on the need 
for greater international, and especially transatlantic, capital mobility; and a 
United Nations with a large and expanding membership of primarily new and 
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small states with the commitment to ‘self determination of peoples’ enshrined 
in its Charter. Carr’s prediction of the domination of world affairs by six or 
seven ‘agglomerations of power’ with a socialist Britain heading the Western 
European agglomeration also did not come to pass. A kind of socialism 
prevailed in Britain from 1945-1979, but it was one so circumstantially 
contingent and so riddled with pragmatic compromises as to be barely worthy 
of the name. Britain’s leadership of Europe was never a serious proposition 
given her imperial preoccupations, continental suspicions, Westward 
inclinations, and catalogue of economic woes. In fact Carr’s reading of the 
near-future of foreign affairs and the structure of world politics is fascinating 
for what it gets wrong more than for the little it gets right. And if not precisely 
in the way Carr envisaged it, his preferred policy of appeasement not only 
failed but became associated with the very utopianism he sought to 
disparage. 
 
 Fortunately, however, IR is not a policy science. While there are those 
who believe that scientific methods can be used to good effect in the study of 
international relations, and those who engage in policy debates and make 
policy suggestions based on their specialist knowledge, IR is best thought of 
not as a science, nor even an academic discipline, but as a socio-intellectual 
space. This space has been developing largely organically for about a 
century, and within it a wide variety of conversations now take place, some 
concerned with policy, some method, some explanation, some prediction, 
some normative issues. The vast majority of them, however, revolve around 
the question: how best can we go about explaining or understanding relations 
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between the political communities and other significant actors that engage in 
politics beyond the borders of our own community, within that arena that we 
variously call the international/world/global system/society. The very 
catholicity of the socio-intellectual space called IR is one of the reasons why 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis is still widely read and avidly discussed today. While 
it can in some respects be viewed as a period piece—and it still finds a 
prominent place in inter-war History courses, particularly those focussing on 
the politics of appeasement—it is a work of such wide intellectual range, 
thematic grandeur, and breadth of vision, that it retains the capacity to inspire 
a wide variety of contemporary theorists. Realists, critical theorists, historical 
materialists and English school theorists have all been inspired by his ideas 
and have seen him as a trail-blazer of their particular portion of the IR socio-
intellectual space. If this space had remained the narrow one—the study of 
the political relations of states—recommended by some of its pioneers it is 
doubtful that The Twenty Years’ Crisis would have been appreciated in quite 
the way it is today. Yes, it would be seen as a classic of power analysis, a 
seminal work that reasserted the perennial importance of the independent 
power of the nation-state. But the subtleties of the book, Carr’s radicalism, 
utopianism, and historicism, would be confined to the sidelines—as they are, 
largely, in one of the most widely cited articles on Carr written by one such 
pioneer.1
 
 The reasons for the classic status of the book are widely understood. 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis is a counter-hegemonic text, indeed the most 
                                                 
1 Hedley Bull, ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On’, International Journal, 24, 4 (1969), 626-
38. 
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successful counter-hegemonic text in the field—more successful than those 
towering books of more recent times, Theory of International Politics and 
Social Theory of International Politics, both of which have had a major impact 
on theoretical debates, but neither of which have provoked a disciplinary 
paradigm shift. The impact of The Twenty Years’ Crisis may not have been as 
devastating to received wisdom as it is sometimes made out to be2, but there 
is no question that it profoundly altered the outlook and basic assumptions of 
the succeeding generation of IR scholars. For these scholars—e.g. Martin 
Wight, Hedley Bull, Joseph Frankel, Susan Strange, Hans Morgenthau, 
Nicholas Spykman, John Herz—the liberal internationalist, progressivist, 
League-orientated (and for Carr ‘utopian’) outlook and assumptions of the first 
generation of IR scholars—the likes of Alfred Zimmern, Philip Noel-Baker, 
Gilbert Murray, Arnold Toynbee, Pitman Potter, James Shotwell, Frederick 
Sherwood Dunn—were not only dated and questionable, but parochial, 
intellectually shallow, and wrong. Carr successfully demonstrated to them that 
‘the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being 
the expression of absolute and a priori principles, are historically conditioned, 
being both products of circumstances and weapons framed for the 
furtherance of interests.’3 The bankruptcy of utopianism resided ‘not in its 
failure to live up to its principles, but in the exposure of its inability to provide 
any absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international 
affairs’.4 The supposedly absolute and universal principles of the utopian were 
                                                 
2 Many of the ‘utopians’ Carr criticised carried on writing in much the same liberal internationalist 
vein. See Peter Wilson, ‘Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1939-46’, 
in M. Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (London: Palgrave, 2000), 165-97. 
3 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939), 87. 
4 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 111 
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not principles at all ‘but the unconscious reflexions of national policy based on 
a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time’.5 And what 
were these theories, standards, and principles? Most straight-forwardly: 
collective security6; disarmament7; free trade8; the indivisibility of peace9. But 
more complexly: the idea that theory creates practice and that ‘political theory 
is a norm to which political practice ought to conform’10; the notion that power 
is a product of morality and that politics can be made to conform to an 
independent ethical standard11; the belief that the good life, internationally, is 
a question of right reasoning, that the spread of education will enable people 
to reason rightly, and that everyone that reasons rightly will necessarily act 
rightly12; the corresponding belief that war results from a failure of 
understanding, and that the spread of education will lead to peace13; the 
belief that through the League and other international bodies power could be 
eliminated from international politics and ‘discussion substituted for armies 
and navies’14; and belief in the neutrality of international law and the 
possibility of ‘dissolving’ politics into law (through arbitration, adjudication, 
etc.).15 Carr convinced this influential post-war generation of scholars, in other 
words, that power, appearances sometimes to the contrary16, is ‘a decisive 
                                                 
5 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 111. 
6 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 13-14, 20-21, 139-44 
7 See e.g. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 25, 94-6, 177-78. 
8 See e.g. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 56-61, 69-77. 
9 See e.g. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 67-9. 
10 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 17. 
11 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 28. 
12 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 34-6. 
13 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 35-6, 67. 
14 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 131-39. 
15 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 104-6, 232-63. 
16 See especially in this connection Carr’s penetrating analysis of Locarno, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 135-
37. 
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factor in every political situation’. To ignore it was ‘purely utopian’.17 He 
convinced them that law and order, collective security, disarmament, the 
indivisibility of peace, free trade were, in the inter-war period, little more than 
the slogans of privileged groups. They were not universal interests or 
principles but the ideology of satisfied classes and nations the function of 
which was to preserve their privileged position in an age when objective 
conditions were no longer conducive.  Unknown to itself, utopianism became 
the tool of vested interests. International morality, as expounded by the 
utopians, became ‘little more than a convenient weapon for belabouring those 
who assail the status quo’.18 It was not that assertions of the universal value 
of peace, security, law, order, morality, were always invalid, but one had to 
look for the interests that lay behind them, the ideological purposes that they 
always to some extent served.19 The scepticism of these scholars to the 
liberal vision of a more rational, harmonious, progressive international order is 
largely rooted in Carr—though it is fair to say that while they accepted his 
Marxist-inspired critique20 of the materially conditioned nature liberal thought, 
they extended their scepticism to Carr’s own vision of a progressive socialist, 
collectivist and functionalist world order.21
 
                                                 
17 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 301. 
18 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 187. 
19 For an analysis of Carr’s understanding of ‘utopianism’ and its impact in IR see Peter Wilson, The 
International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth Century Idealism (New York: Palgrave, 
2003), ch.2; Lucian Ashworth, International Relations and the Labour Party: Intellectuals and Policy 
Making from 1918-1945 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 9-27. 
20 In his superb biography of Carr, Jonathan Haslam asserts that ‘Carr could never truly be called a 
Marxist’ (The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892-1982 (London: Verso, 1999), 54). This may be true, 
but as Carr later acknowledged, in the 1930s he did ‘a lot of reading and thinking on Marxist lines. The 
result was The 20 Years’ Crisis…not exactly a Marxist work, but strongly impregnated with Marxist 
ways of thinking, applied to international affairs (Carr, ‘An Autobiography’, in Cox (ed.), Carr: A 
Critical Appraisal, xix). 
21 On which see e.g. Peter Wilson, ‘The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain’, in P. Murray and P. 
Rich (eds.), Visions of European Unity (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 41-6;  
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 Secondly, The Twenty Years’ Crisis was not only a remarkably 
successful counter-hegemonic text it was ‘the first “scientific” treatment of 
modern world politics’.22 Hoffmann’s quotation-marks signal the problematic 
nature of this term. Yet there can be no doubt that Carr’s book investigated a 
range of questions, concerning the nature and role of power, morality, law, 
and change in international relations, in a systematic and critical way that 
marked a distinct break with the past. Though Carr may have overstated the 
case in Part One of the book (‘The Science of International Politics’) there can 
be no doubt that the prevailing ethos in the young field of IR was that of the 
missionary not the scientist. Some substantial empirical work had been done 
in the field, e.g. on public international unions, on the growth of international 
cooperation, on the arms trade, and on nature and role of the League of 
Nations23, but even this work had a transparently teleological and normative 
purpose. The focus was not on ‘what is, and why’ but ‘how can things be 
made better’. While eschewing crude empiricism (‘political science is the 
science not only of what is, but of what ought to be’24) Carr demonstrated that 
far greater attention needed to be given to explanation of ‘what is’ before the 
important task of determining ‘how can things be improved’ could be begun. 
The ‘utopians’ were discussing colour schemes and soft furnishings before 
the foundations of the house had been laid. Far more work needed to be done 
                                                 
22 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus, 106, 4 (1977), 
43. 
23 See e.g. Paul S. Reinsch, Public International Unions (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1911); L. S. 
Woolf, International Government: Two Reports (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1916); Philip 
Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936); Alfred 
Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (London: Macmillan, 1936). 
24 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 7. 
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on the foundations of IR before the ‘elegant superstructure’ of this or that 
preferred world order could be properly built.25
  
 These are the two prime reasons why Carr’s book is regarded as a 
classic in the socio-intellectual space that is IR. It was the first successful 
counter-hegemonic book, and in this regard it bears comparison with 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, if not Origin of 
Species, Das Kapital, and The Interpretation of Dreams—works that not only 
had a disciplinary impact but were epoch-making. It was, in addition, the first 
book to grapple with a range of general international matters in the spirit of 
science—in the spirit, that is, of detached enquiry stripped of the liberal 
rationalist teleology that subconsciously infused virtually all works on the 
subject of the period. This is not to say Carr did not have a concept of 
progress. In some visceral respects he was a product of the Victorian age in 
which he was born and the Victorian curriculum (narrow, patriotic, classical) 
that he was fed at Merchant Taylor’s and Cambridge26. He fell out of love with 
and into contempt for liberalism in the 1920s27, but not the notion of progress. 
Rather he substituted ‘the planned society’ for the liberal laissez faire 
conceptions of natural harmony and spontaneous order of his youth. 
 
                                                 
25 Could this metaphor (see Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 307) have influenced the naming of C.A.W. 
Manning’s ‘The Structure of International Society’, which remains to this day the core first year course 
of the BSc International Relations at LSE? Carr’s emphasis on the need to understand the elementals of 
world politics—the basic relationships between sovereignty, power, law, morality, and order—strongly 
influenced Manning. 
26 Towards the end of his life he confessed to his friend Tamara Deutscher, ‘I remain a good Victorian 
at heart’. Quoted in Haslam, Vices of Integrity, 9. 
27 See Haslam, Vices of Integrity, chs. 2-3; Michael Cox, ‘Introduction’, Carr, The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, Reissue (London: Palgrave, 2001), xiv-xix. 
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 But the point here is that he sought to root his own admittedly utopian 
agenda firmly in the soil of international reality.28 More precisely he observed 
in that reality the shoots of a new kind of social and political order, and saw it 
his job as a historian/political scientist29 to help bring it about. So the ‘hard 
ruthless analysis of reality’ that he considered the ‘essential ingredient’ of the 
science of international relations,30 was the analysis of a reality the substance 
of which was already settled in his mind—partly ‘observed’ for sure, but at 
least as much confirmed or normatively willed into existence.  His method was 
much influenced by Marx and Mannheim.31 Far from proceeding inductively, 
Carr’s science of international relations was built around an understanding of 
history as a struggle between haves and have-nots, conditioned by the social 
and economic circumstances of the times, but one in which the notion of 
progress was never entirely absent.  His sense of the pervasiveness of power 
in social life acquired from twenty years in the Foreign Office never 
succeeded in obliterating his belief that progress, although often paradoxical 
or contradictory, was the normal condition of history and that Man retained the 
capacity to use his reason to shape history towards progressive ends.32 It is 
for this reason that while one finds in The Twenty Years’ Crisis the hard, 
ruthless, unsentimental analysis of later American realists, and much of the 
cynicism, one finds none of the pessimism. Carr’s realism is of a very different 
                                                 
28 ‘This [his socialist vision], too, is utopia. But it stands more directly in the line of recent advance 
than visions of a world federation or blue-prints of a more perfect League of Nations’ (Carr, Twenty 
Years’ Crisis, 307). 
29 It is not at all clear from Carr’s pages that he would recognise such a distinction, except in an entirely 
formal sense. 
30 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 13-14. 
31 For the influence of Mannheim see Charles Jones, E. H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to 
Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch.6. 
32 This is palpable in Carr’s Conditions of Peace (London: Macmillan, 1942) and The New Society 
(London: Macmillan, 1951) but also strong in the final chapter of Twenty Years’ Crisis. 
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kind to that of the realists he is generally associated33—though material to 
superficially support such an association can easily be found. 
 
 The Twenty Years’ Crisis is far from a flawless work. Some have called 
it a polemic.34 Over the years it has been criticised for its moral relativism, its 
misrepresentation of various ideas and views, its inconsistent use of terms 
(particularly ‘utopia’ and ‘reality’), its prescriptive unhelpfulness, and its 
totalitarian implications—and by writers across the political spectrum, from 
fellow socialists such as Crossman and Woolf, to liberals such as Angell and 
Hayek, and conservatives such as Wight and Morgenthau.35 The theoretical 
coherence of the book can be questioned36, and Carr was certainly not above 
using the ‘extraordinary dexterity with which he could deploy the English 
language’37 to get himself out of more than one philosophical tight corner.38 
But virtually all of the critics have, if sometimes begrudgingly, noted the 
                                                 
33 See, further, Jones, Carr and International Relations, ch. 7; Michael Cox, ‘Will the real E. H. Carr 
Please Stand Up?’, International Affairs, 75, 3 (1999), 643-53; Peter Wilson, ‘Radicalism for a 
Conservative Purpose: The Peculiar Realism of E. H. Carr’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 30, 1 (2001), 123-36; Seán Malloy, The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power 
Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2006), ch. 3. 
34 See e.g. Andreas Osiander, ‘Rereading Early Twentieth-century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 42, 3 (1998), 410; Duncan Bell, ‘Political Theory and the Functions of 
Intellectual History: A Response to Emmanuel Navon’, Review of International Studies, 29, 1 (2003), 
154-5. 
35 See e.g. Wilson, ‘Carr and his Early Critics’, 165-83; R. H. S. Crossman, The Charm of Politics and 
Other Essays in Political Criticism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1958), 91-4; Leonard Woolf, ‘Utopia 
and Reality’, Political Quarterly, 11, 2 (1940), 167-82; Norman Angell, ‘Who are the Utopians? And 
who the Realists?’, Headway, January 1940, 4-5; F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Ark 
Paperbacks, 1986 [1944]), 138-41, 169-72; Martin Wight, ‘The Realist’s Utopia’, review of  Twenty 
Years’ Crisis (2nd edn.), Observer, 21 July 1946, 3; Hans Morgenthau, ‘The Political Science of E. H. 
Carr’, World Politics, 1 (1948-49), 127-34. 
36 See e.g. Susan Stebbing, Ideals and Illusions (London: Watts and Co., 1941), 6-18; Michael Joseph 
Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1986), ch. 4. 
37 Haslam, Vices of Integrity, 7. 
38 Note here the clever ways in which Carr modified his support for appeasement and his attribution of 
blame to the ‘satisfied powers’ in the second edition of the book. See Michael Cox, ‘From the First to 
the Second Edition of The Twenty Years’ Crisis: A Case of Self-censorship?’, in Carr, Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, Reissue, lxxii-1xxxii. Note also Jones’ judgment (Carr and International Relations, 46ff.): ‘The 
book is treacherous: its rhetoric is complex and its true intentions are never clearly or fully disclosed’. 
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brilliance of the book, its enduring ability to provoke fresh thought, its capacity 
to challenge not only conventional assumptions but the very vocabulary of our 
understanding. In this respect it is the first genuinely critical work of IR. I will 
leave the last words on The Twenty Years’ Crisis to one of my current MSc 
students, a History graduate who knew nothing about Carr and his reputation 
in IR until arriving at the LSE: ‘…clearly the work of some kind of genius’.39 
This is true. 
                                                 
39 David Lloyd, IR410 ‘International Politics’ Essay 1. 
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